

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 00586 01 OF 02 041218Z

53

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 019026

R 041130Z FEB 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9909

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0586

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: US ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POINT MONITORING PROPOSAL

REF: (A) STATE 1757; (B) USNATO 6996

1. MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW REVISED COVERING NOTE FOR U.S. ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POST PORPOSAL. AT JANUARY 14 WG MEETING, MAJORITY OF WG MEMBERS SUPPORTED U.S. CHANGES (REF A) TO EARLIER VERSION OF COVERING NOTE (REF B). FRG REP (DZIALAS) HAD INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTING SUBSTANTILA REVISIONS IN EARLIER COVERING NOTE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF SUPPORT FOR U.S. APPROACH, FRG REP AGREED TO PUT ASIDE HIS REVISIONS AND TO REFER U.S. CHANGES TO BONN.

2. AT JANUARY 28 MEETING ALL MEMBERS EXCEPT FRG AGREED TO U.S. CHANGES. FRG REP PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TRANSMITTED BELOW. CANADIAN REP (BECKETT) REMARKED THAT BY INSISTING ON POLITICALLY SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00586 01 OF 02 041218Z

MOTIVATED CHANGES FRG WAS UNDERMINING VALIDITY OF MILITARY TECH-
NICAL ANALYSIS. WHILE THERE WAS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR FRG AMEND-
MENTS, WG ACCEPTED MOST OF THEM IN INTEREST OF ACHIEVING AN
AGREED PAPER. ON BASIS OF DISCUSSION, STAFF GROUP HAS CIRCULATED

NEW DRAFT TRANSMITTED IN PARA 5 BELOW. NEW DRAFT INCORPORATES U.S. CHANGES (REF A), FRG AMENDMENTS AS MODIFIED BY WG, AND MINOR SUGGESTIONS OF OTHER WG MEMBERS.

3. COMMENT: MISSION BELIEVES BONN'S AMENDMENTS AS MODIFIED IN WG DO NOT DISTORT THURST OF U.S. REVISIONS IN REF A. ACTION REQUESTED: AUTHORIZATION TO ACCEPT COVERING NOTE TRANSMITTED BELOW AT FEBRUARY 11 WG MEETING.

4. FOLLOWING ARE AMENDMENTS FRG REP PRESENTED JANUARY 28 (PARA NUMBERS ARE KEYED TO NOTE TRANSMITTED BELOW).

(A) PARA 2 SHOULD SAY FEG COMMENT SET OUT SOME POLITICAL "AND TECHNICAL" CONSIDERATIONS.

(B) PARA 3 SHOULD BEGIN "MAJORITY" OF WG AGREE WITH CONCLUSIONS OF U.S. ANALYSIS.

(C) IN PARA 3A(3), DELETE WORD "LIMITED" BEFORE WORD "DETERRENCE". OTHER MEMBERS OPPOSED THIS CHANGE AND FINALLY AGREED TO WORD "SOME" IN PLACE OF "LIMITED".

(D) IN PARA 3B(2) DELETE PHRASE "WHICH MIGHT INCREASE WARNING TIME". FRG REP SAID BONN "DOUBTED ESSENTIAL GAIN IN WARNING TIME COULD BE ACHIEVED UNLESS VERIFICATION WAS EXTENDED INTO USSR WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS; IN A SITUATION OF RAPID BUILD-UP THERE WOULD BE NOT ONLY UNUSUAL FLUCTUATIONS WITHIN THE NGA BUT ALSO HIGH PROBABILITY OF INCREASED MOVEMENTS ACROSS LINES BORDERING NGA".

(E) IN PARA 5, FRG WANTED FIRST SENTENCE TO READ: "IN PRINCIPLE" A FIXED POST SYSTEM "SEEMS TO BE" LESS EFFICIENT IF A COMPARISON IS MADE OF EXPECTED RESULT AGAINST EFFORT "BUT IN SOME CASES THIS MIGHT NOT BE VALID". WG DID NOT ACCEPT THIS CHANGE BUT AGREED TO BEGIN SENTENCE "TO THE EXTENT SHOWN ABOVE, A FIXED POST SYSTEM" ETC. FRG REP MAINTAINED FINAL ASSESSMENT OF REQUIRED VERIFICATION WILL DEPEND ON WHAT HAS TO BE VERIFIED
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00586 01 OF 02 041218Z

AND BY WHAT MEANS OVERT SYSTEM SHOULD FILL THE GAPS NOT COVERED BY NTM AND OTHER METHODS. FOR PHASE I, BONN WOULD FORESEE INSPECTIONS ONLY AT EXIT/ENTRY POINTS TO SEE WHETHER CONTRAVENTIONS OF AN AGREEMENT HAD OCCURRED. BONN EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 5 SAYING TECHNICAL COMPARISONS ASSUME INSPECTION TEAMS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TOUR NGA WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT INTERFERENCE AND MAJOR ACCESS RESTRICTIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 00586 02 OF 02 041244Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 019278

R 041130Z FEB 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9910

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 0586

5. BEGIN TEXT OF REVISED COVERING NOTE:

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

NOTE BY THE STAFF GROUP

1. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, IN A REPORT (1) IN MAY 1974, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERT VERIFICATION IN MBFR AND RENDERED THE FINDING THAT TO VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF OVERT INSPECTION. THE WORKING GROUP RECOGNIZED IN THAT REPORT (1) THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN RECIPROCAL INSPECTION.

2. AS A RESULT OF LATER DISCUSSION, IN THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES CARRIED OUT A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF A SYSTEM OF OVERT INSPECTION FOR PHASE I BY FIXED (STATIC) INSPECTION POSTS. THAT ANALYSIS IS AT ANNEX A FOR BASE OF REFERENCE. A COMMENT ON THE ANALYSIS BY THE GERMAN
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00586 02 OF 02 041244Z

MEMBER OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, SETTING OUT SOME POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, IS AT ANNEX B.

3. HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF THE WORKING GROUP AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE US ANALYSIS THAT THE CAPABILITIES OF INSPECTION BY STATIC POSTS, WITH MOVEMENT INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA LIMITED TO THESE POINTS BY THE AGREEMENT, ARE THOSE BELOW:

A. A FIXED POST SYSTEM COULD:

(1) PROVIDE VALUABLE MEANS FOR VERIFYING AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND MONITORING MOVEMENT THROUGH DECLARED AND MANNED ENTRY/EXIT POINTS.

(2) MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO EXECUTE A MAJOR RAPID BUILD-UP FROM THE USSR UNLESS THE SOVIETS OPTED FOR AN OUTRIGHT ABROGATION OF THE MBFR AGREEMENT PROVISION RESTRICTING THE POINTS OF ENTRY.

(3) PROVIDE SOME DETERRENCE AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF USSR FORCES INTO THE NGA BY OTHER THAN AGREED ENTRY POINTS BECAUSE ANY SUCH INTRODUCTION WOULD INVOLVE A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

(4) PROVIDE FOR THE FACT THAT NATIONAL/OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD NEED ONLY TO DETECT ANY MILITARY MOVEMENT THROUGH NON-AUTHORIZED CROSSING POINTS FOR A VIOLATION TO BE DISCOVERED.

B. A NEGOTIATED INSPECTION SYSTEM
LIMITED TO A FIXED POST SYSTEM COULD NOT PROVIDE:

(1) OBSERVATION OF THE FORCES DEPLOYED WITHIN THE AREA AND OBSERVANCE OF ANY LIMITATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE AGREED.

(2) RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF ABNORMAL ACTIVITY IN THE NGA.

(3) VERIFICATION OF AGREED PROVISIONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO ENTRY/EXIT OF NGA, E.G. STORAGE OF EQUIPMENT.

4. THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL BY AIR OR SEA COULD ONLY BE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00586 02 OF 02 041244Z

MONITORED AT NOMINATED AIRFIELDS AND PORTS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A FIXED POST SYSTEM WOULD DEPEND ON THE SOVIETS USING ONLY THESE NOMINATED AIRFIELDS AND PORTS FOR AIRLIFT OR SEA TRANSPORT OF TROOPS AND ON THE CAPABILITY OF NATIONAL/OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION TO DETECT AIR/SEA MOVEMENT OF TROOPS THROUGH OTHER AIRFIELDS AND PORTS.

5. TO THE EXTENT AS SHOWN ABOVE A FIXED POST INSPECTION SYSTEM IS LESS EFFICIENT THAN MOBILE INSPECTION IF A COMPARISON IS MADE OF EXPECTED RESULT AGAINST EFFORT. A FIXED POST SYSTEM IS ALSO EASIER TO CIRCUMVENT THAN MOBILE INSPECTION. THESE TECHNICAL COMPARISONS ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TOUR THE NGA WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT INTERFERENCE AND MAJOR ACCESS RESTRICTIONS.

6. THE WORKING GROUP NOTED THAT SOME NATIONS HAVE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE HOLDINGS OF NUMBERS OF RAIL AND ROAD CROSSINGS OR MAIN PORTS AND THAT THE NUMBER OF INSPECTORS SUGGESTED AS REQUIRED TO MAN FIXED

POSTS MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT ON THE LOW SIDE. THIS DOES NOT
HOWEVER AFFECT THE THRUST OF THE US ANALYSIS.

END TEXT BURCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO00586
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740267/abbrytao.tel
Line Count: 222
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) STATE 1757; (B) USNATO 6996
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19-Jul-2001 by willialc>; APPROVED <30 APR 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: US ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POINT MONITORING PROPOSAL
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005